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This paper inquires whether informal workers (self-employed and salaried employed) have incentives for 
informality as modern approaches have suggested. We analyse the job flows of Mexico, as observed through 
four waves of a comprehensive survey conducted at household level between years 2001 and 2004. For each 
macro-region of the country, we build a set of Markov transition matrices for testing the disposition or 
propensity of workers to move across sectors. Individual panel data are then estimated in order to assess the 
wage differentials between formal and informal workers. We find evidence of stronger incentives to become 
informal worker in the less developed regions of the country rather than in the more industrialized and 
innovative ones. However, some degree of segmentation often prevents workers from reacting to the incentives. 
Our results suggest that different regions of Mexico have different patterns of employment and that such patterns 





Economic liberalization, investment patterns and technical innovation are having a dramatic impact on 
employment around the world, and Mexico is not an exception. However, there is no single meaning of 
economic liberalization for workforce. The impact of these phenomena can be negative or positive and 
differs by industry, by legal status and by region across and within countries. Although increasing 
attention is given to the impact of liberalization on labour, there is a bias towards looking at the impact 
of liberalization on formal wage work and, to a lesser extent, on  
informal employment.  
 
In the particular case of Mexico, the benefits of the liberalization strategy have been highly 
concentrated across the territory and this has affected informal employment rates. Official data have 
recorded a wide variation and a divergent dynamics of the informality rates across the different regions 
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of Mexico (INEGI, 2004). While the northern states – a region that as result of the liberalization 
process was able to attract the more productive an innovative industries – have reduced their 
informality rates, the states located in the less developed south have experienced a substantial increase 
in the share of workers characterized by an informal status.  
 
What is the reason behind this heterogeneous and divergent pattern of employment? How has the 
differential of regional productivity impacted informal employment? Traditional wisdom would blame 
the pattern of regional economic growth of such performance. This approach would suggest that in the 
poor south not enough jobs are created for all the people seeking jobs. As a result, many frustrated 
formal job seekers find employment or create their own work in the informal economy. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that the rich north – given its economic performance- has been able of creating 
jobs for a growing population. Therefore, in this traditional framework, informal activities can be seen 
as a sort of last resort for those who missed getting a formal position. 
 
However, more recent theories see also the informal sector as a valid source of employment, where the 
worker can show her/his initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. Hence, the worker is assumed to be a 
rational agent who is able to calculate the costs and benefits that a particular legal status implies. In 
such context, a highly productive formal sector could entail better wages and thus augment the 
opportunity cost of informal jobs. In addition, a more productive formal sector could offer better and 
more efficient social benefits (e.g. health insurance), thus becoming more attractive to workers than 
informal activities. Under this perspective, southern and central formal economies are not attractive 
enough to workers and provide an incentive for the creation of informal jobs. 
 
The remarkable polarization detected in Mexico and the existence of proper data gives us the unique 
opportunity of testing the foregoing hypotheses. In particular, this work aims to study the following 
questions. What is the relationship, if any, between informality and the level of regional development? 
Are there empirical elements to support any of the competing theories explaining informality? How has 
the increasing concentration of more productive and innovative activities affected the pattern of 
informal employment across Mexico?  
 
We rely on data collected by the official Mexican Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI) as part of the National Survey of Employment (ENEU). This survey has been conducted at 




house and urban level in the 44 major metropolitan areas of Mexico. Among others, we find some 
evidence of a positive wage premium for formal salaried jobs relative to less-favoured jobs in the 
informal sector; (i.e. informal salaried and, particularly, self-employed involved in agricultural 
activities). On the other hand, our results show that those workers who switch from formal salaried jobs 
to non agricultural informal self-employed ones perceive a wage premium. Interestingly, this result 
changes across regions: while in the less developed region of the country (south) this premium is 
positive and significant; in the north such premium is negative, even if non significant. This suggests 
the presence of stronger incentives to become informal worker in the less developed regions of the 
country than in more industrialized ones and seems to corroborate the hypothesis that workers in less 
productive economies have economic incentives to engage informal jobs. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe some antecedents and the Mexican 
economic context. In particular, we highlight the spatial concentration of the most productive industries 
on certain regions of Mexico as a consequence of the liberalization process carried out in the mid 
eighties in Mexico. In section 3, we describe the general pattern of employment in the less developed 
countries and state a brief review of the competing approaches to informal employment. In section 4, 
we introduce the data and the operational definition used. In the same section, we proceed to classify 
our data according to region, type of work, legal status (formal and informal) and industry. In section 5 
we estimate at individual level, and for each region separately, the factors driving the incidence of 
informality for the various components of employment (self-employment, salaried employment), and 
we look at the wages determinants by means of Mincerian equations. In section 6, applying transition 
matrixes, we estimate worker flows among the different sectors of the labour market across the 
different regions of Mexico in order to prove if determined type of mobility holds true across the 
different regions of Mexico. In section 7, individual two time panel (one year length period) data are 
used to assess the wage differentials between formal and informal. Those differentials provide a 
measure of earning changes associated with job-to-job transitions across employment sectors. The final 
section (8) concludes and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Antecedents. Mexico as a polarized economy 
 
After the mid eighties, in order to liberalize its economy, Mexico drastically reformed its strategy of 
development and modified its institutional set-up. The basic idea behind these economic reforms was 




that a strategy based on international trade and free competition would solve the persistent problems of 
inflation, growth and employment that characterized the Mexican economy during a large part of the 
second half of the 20th century§ ( Dussel, 2000; Stallings and Weller, 2001; Weller, 2001; Palma, 
2003).  
 
Among the main economic goals proposed by the advocates of this new strategy of development, it is 
important to mention the following two (Dussel 2000): to transform Mexico’s productive sector from 
import-substitution to export-orientation, and to transform the manufacturing export-oriented sector in 
the motor of socioeconomic development. Towards these objectives, in 1986 a crucial step was taken 
by Mexico becoming full member of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
initiating a gradual elimination of some restrictions to foreign investment, in particular of those 
directed to capital and technical investments. 
 
Considering its main aims, the liberalization period has been relatively successful. Indeed, inflation 
rates decreased substantially reaching up one-digit levels during the second part of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, Mexico was particularly successful in attracting foreign investments during the same 
period: Dussel reports that, in terms of gross capital formation, foreign direct investment increased 
from levels below 6% to more than 20% during the 1990s. In this context, private manufacturing 
exports became the main motor of economic growth in Mexico, accounted for more than 85% of 
Mexico’s total exports since the second half of the 1990s. Within manufacturing, maquiladoras shares 
has increased from 50.7 % in 1991 to 54.8 % in 2004 (Capdevielle, 2008). 
 
However, the benefits across the territory have been highly concentrated: given their proximity to the U. 
S. market and larger endowments of communications, transportation and energy infrastructures, the 
initially richer northern states have been able to attract massive foreign direct investment and 
concentrate the more productive and innovative industries (Besnainou and Davezies, 1998; Dussel, 
2000; Chiquiar, 2004). Instead, the central and southern states hardly exhibited an improvement in their 
                                                 
§ The period prior to the implementation of the liberalization strategy in Mexico, 1982-1987, was one of profound 
socioeconomic instability:  the Mexican government was under enormous pressure to service an external debt of more than 
70% of GDP (gross domestic product), while inflation rates and the fiscal deficit, as a percentage of GDP, accounted for 
levels above 160% and 16%, respectively (Villarreal, 2000). 
 
 




economic performance. As a result, and considering that average GDP per capita growth has not increased 
substantially in the last twenty years, there has been a widening of the “North-South” gap in Mexico (see 
figure 1) 
Figure 1 






























Source: Own elaboration based on INEGI estimations. 
 
In spite of all these reforms, the average trend of employment has not gained any significant impulse 
and open unemployment in Mexico could actually be considered erratic. In addition, concerning 
informal employment, statistics provided by INEGI reveal a wide variation across the different regions 
of Mexico for the 1996-2003 period. This heterogeneous pattern is illustrated in figure 2 , which shows 
not only that informal employment rates are lower in the industrialized north than in the less developed 
centre and the backward south, but also that, in the north (north-east), informality rates tend to 




decrease, while in the centre and south they stay constant or even increase**. Such heterogeneity 
deserves more attention that it has received so far. 
Figure 2 



































 Source: Own elaboration based on INEGI estimations (INEGI, 2004). 
 
OLS (pooled) estimations are applied in order to confirm the correlation between the log of informal-
employment rates and the logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPpc). In these estimations, we rely on data 
provided by INEGI that regards aggregate information on 32 states of the Mexican Republic in a period 
from 1996 to 2003 (excluding 1997 and 1999).  
 
Our cross section estimations (table 1) essentially support the largely accepted hypothesis that the level 
of development (GDP) is negatively correlated to informal employment rates (Lewis, 1954; Kuznets, 
                                                 
** INEGI (2004) has  classified as informal the following activities: a) non registered self employed b) employed in non-
registered micro-firms c) non- salaried workers in non- registered micro-firms d)  non-registered workers in micro-firms 
without fixed location e) remunerated workers with a maximum of two months length contract in a registered micro firm f)  
remunerated workers without contract and without social security in non-registered micro-firms g) remunerated workers 
without contract and without social insurance in a micro firms without fixed location. 
 




1966; Lucas, 1970; Cimoli et al, 2005). In addition, those regional dummy variables reinforce the 
previous empirical finding: they show a negative and statistically significant correlation between the 
northern states (the more developed ones) and informality and a positive correlation between 
informality rates and the central states (centre)††.  
Table 1 
OLS Pooled Regressions 
Informal Employment  Determinants (log) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
          
GDPpc (log) -0.085 0.019 -4.48 0 
schooling -0.047 0.014 -3.36 0.001 
Female Labour Force (%) 0.016 0.004 4.13 0 
South Region -0.009 0.027 -0.32 0.747 
Centre 0.135 0.027 5.08 0 
northeast -0.128 0.034 -3.79 0 
northwest -0.149 0.029 -5.07 0 
Constant 3.836 0.188 20.36 0 
  Dependent variable: informal employment rates by state (log) 
 
The former result would suggest that informal -employment is a kind of ‘sponge’ providing subsistence 
for those who could not find better alternatives. However, the mechanism through which the level of 
development contributes to reduce informality is not clear. Traditional wisdom could attribute the 
pattern of employment in the northern regions to a massive investment in formal sectors that lead to the 
creation of formal employment. Instead, the backward south economy was not able to create the new 
jobs required by a growing labour population and has forced many workers to enter the informal sector. 
However, more recent theories suggest that the increasing informality might be voluntary and related to 





                                                 
†† In addition, we have controlled for some demographic (female labour force participation) and educational variables. Our 
results show a positive and statistical significant relationship between the level of informality rates and female labour force 
participation and a negative and significant one between schooling and levels of informal employment. These results are 
very in line with a large literature on the social demographic characteristics of the informal sector  and self-employment. 
(Freije, 2001; Pietrobelli et al, 2004). 
 




3. Describing the pattern of employment in less developed countries: introducing the informal 
sector 
 
It is broadly accepted that in less developed countries the widely used employment/unemployment 
dichotomy – appropriated for industrialized countries – is a poor measure of labour market rigidity and 
does not contribute to clarify the analysis of labour quality. In fact, as pointed out by Bourguignon 
(2005), in less developed countries the absence of formal employment insurance systems implies that 
open unemployment is limited to a small number of people who have enough resources to wait until a 
job with the characteristics they are looking for actually opens‡‡. Thereby, the very poor are not 
unemployed: they are constrained to work in low-remunerative, low-productive forms of activity. 
 
Recognizing that the employment/unemployment dichotomy is too simplistic, we should look for new 
approaches to assess the performance of labour markets in less developed countries. In this context, the 
informal/formal dichotomy has been proposed by many authors as a concept that would describe better 
the employment pattern in Mexico and give a proper indication of job quality.  
In fact, the informal sector presents some characteristics that deserve attention: a) informal activities 
have low productivity; b) informal activities escape taxes and erode the legal system; c) informal 
workers lack social protection and medical insurance.  
 
In spite of a large literature produced in the last years, the nature of the informal sector still remains 
nebulous and controversial: while some authors consider informal activities as survival ones, the others 
consider them as an integrated and competitive group of activities. The first and most traditional school 
considers the informal sector as a group of disadvantaged activities, where workers enter only as a last 
resort opportunity (Fields, 2004, 2005). The thesis behind this hypothesis is that the formal sector is 
rationed because several structural and economic reasons and is, therefore, unable to fulfil the social 
requirements of labour supply. In this way, the informal sector becomes equivalent to the labour 
surplus mentioned by Arthur Lewis§§ in his well known seminal work (Lewis, 1954, Harris and Todaro, 
1970; Tokman, 1989, Ros; 2000, Cimoli et al 2005)*** 
 
                                                 
‡‡  Our data point out that Mexican unemployment rate is very low. Moreover, they show that the average schooling of 
unemployed people is higher that the average education of the total labour force. It could be interpreted as evidence than 
only that open unemployment is limited for those workers with enough resources to wait.  
§§ Lewis A (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”. 
*** Portes & Schauffler (1993) presents a good review of the different perspectives concerning informal employment. 




The traditional school has been challenged by a new stream, which considers the informal worker as 
rational and competitive. This view assumes that the economic units are free to choose where to work 
depending on the costs and benefits that an informal legal status entails (De Soto, 1987; Maloney, 
1999; Erickson, 2002; Gong X and van Soest A, 2002; Maloney, 2004). Thereby, this school refuses 
the idea that informal workers are in a less advantaged position and that they are the poorest in the 
economy. On the contrary, it is argued that they are competitive and could be easily compared to the 
voluntary small firms and self-employed people in most developed economies rather than being a 
distinct phenomenon.  
 
Actually, this second approach claims that informality is a natural part of a worker life cycle in a 
developing country. According to this view, young workers start their productive life in the informal 
salaried sector in order to get some initial training. Then, they move to the formal salaried sector where 
they accumulate physical and working capital which is used in latter steps to fund informal enterprises. 
If their business is successful, then they become formal and proper entrepreneurs. Therefore, this view 
considers informality as a necessary step in the life cycle of the workers in order to acquire skills and/or 
capital to carry out future entrepreneurs. This idea of informality as an entrepreneurial activity is by far 
the World Bank’s favourite explanation of the phenomenon.  
 
According to Maloney (2004), arguing that workers are voluntarily informal does not imply that they 
are not poor. It implies only that they will not be in a much better situation if they were having the 
formal jobs for which they are qualified. In other words, even though there are better job positions in 
the formal sector, many workers cannot access them simply because they are not qualified enough. 
That is to say, by entering informality they are simply making the best choices they can, given their low 
level of education and their preferences. 
 
It does not imply that the level of formal sector productivity does not play a role in determining the size 
of the informality rates. In fact, a more productive formal sector provides an incentive to the salaried 
worker by augmenting returns to wage work and raising the opportunity cost of managing. A more 
productive formal sector could offer better and more efficient social benefits (e.g. healthy insurance) 
becoming, in this way, more attractive to workers than informal activities. Summing up, this 
perspective considers that workers are free to choose between different packages of benefits and 
opportunities offered by various types of job (formal and informal jobs) of similar quality measured 




along a set of labour characteristics. Basically these are the main Maloney’s hypothesis which is quite 
similar to those expressed by Lucas about self-employment††† (1978).  
 
Finally, there is a more modern theory that mixes the two opposite views exposed above and classify 
informal activities in ‘upper-tier’ and ‘lower-tier’ . This new approach to informality argues that some 
activities within the informal sector could be preferable to some activities in the informal one. Recently 
some empirical works have presented evidence that seems to confirm this hypothesis (Fields, 2005; 
Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007).  
 
4. Data and Operational Definition 
 
The data are provided by the ENEU‡‡‡ (INEGI). This ENEU survey is structured as an occupation track 
of sample units across a five quarters period. The sample data is divided equally into five waves and 
follows the usual procedure of rotation, i.e. one wave enters and one leaves at each quarter. 
 
To generate a sufficiently large sample of roughly 32000 observations, four ENEU cohorts (waves) 
were combined: 2001:4-2002:3, 2002:1-2002:4, 2002:2-2003:1 2003:4-2004:3 Workers were matched 
by household, role gender, level of education, and age to ensure against generating spurious transitions. 
The data have been structured as a two time panel data set, where the first point in time is formed by 
the following cohorts: 2001:4, 2002:1, 2002:2 and 2003:4. The second period is constituted by the rest. 
Sample units are interviewed once per quarter and contribute with one transition pair. 
4.1 The Operational Definition and Data classification 
We roughly follow the operational definition of ILO§§§ by dividing workers into four earning sectors: 
formal salaried, informal salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed and two non-
earning ones: no-pay and out of labour force. However, differently from most of the empirical works of 
this institution, our classification considers all the dimensions of informality: the size of the firm, the 
                                                 
††† As recognized by Pietrobelli el al (2004), in less developed countries self-employment and informal employment are 
very correlated phenomena.  
‡‡‡ National Survey of Employment. 
§§§  ILO (International Labour Organization) classifies as informal the following activities: self-employed workers (with the 
exception of liberal professionals, administrative personal, professionals and technical staff), unpaid family workers and 
both employers and employees from small firms, as well as domestic workers.  




legal status and the lack of healthy insurance or social security. We argue that this kind of definition is 
more accurate and reliable than the definitions which use only one or two dimensions of informality.  
 
For our classification, we proceed as follows: 
First we proceed to classify our data according to type of employment:  
1. Self Employed, i.e. owners of micro-firms (less than 15 if they work in the manufacturing 
sector, less than six otherwise) or own accounts; 
2. Employees or salaried workers, i.e. those remunerated workers who are not independent; 
3. Non-pay workers, i.e. non remunerated dependent workers; 
4.  Out of the labour force, i.e. students, persons engaged in domestic duties, housewives, 
pensioners and other dependent on remittances. 
 
Owners of medium and big firms and open unemployed are dropped since they account only for a very 
small fraction of the sample. 
 
Then, we proceed to identify the worker’s legal status  
A self-employed worker is classified as informal if s/he lacks registration and/or fixed location. Instead, 
a salaried worker is classified as informal if s/he is engaged in micro firms and lacks contract or/and 
social insurance. Some contributions classify non-pay workers as informal ones, but we have decided 
to keep them as a separated group in order to avoid unnecessary mixtures. The final classification can 
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In order to take into account the structural composition, we have classified the workers on the basis of 
type of the industry where they are engaged. Our data allow us to disaggregate them in six industrial 
sectors: Construction, Modern Manufacturing, Traditional Manufacturing, Modern Services, 
Traditional Services and Other Sectors. Due to their different nature, agricultural activities have been 
excluded from most of our estimations. When those activities are included, it will be clearly expressed. 
 
 In the case of Manufacturing, we have followed the Pavitt taxonomy adapted for the Mexican context 
to classify activities (Pavitt, 1984; Dutrénit G. and M. Capdevielle, 1993). In this way, those activities 
classified as “supplier dominated” in the Pavitt framework are denominated in the present work as 
Traditional Manufacturing. The rest of manufacturing (i.e., scale intensive, specialised suppliers and 
science based) are grouped in Modern Manufacturing. 
 
For the particular case of services, we have categorized as “modern” all those activities potentially 
related to modern technology or international trade. In doing so, our classification of the “modern 




services” sector includes financial services, telecommunications and specialized services. Traditional 
services sector is integrated mainly by trade and hotels and restaurants. Finally, in Other Sectors we 
include mining and water, gas and electricity. 
 
Our data show that Informal workers are concentrated in traditional sectors (Table A.1.1) such as 
traditional manufacturing (44.36 %), construction (77.72 %) and traditional services sectors (47.83 %). 
Consequently, most of the modern activities are concentrated in the formal sector even if an important 
share of the formal sector is still constituted by traditional activities. This pattern of employment holds 
true elsewhere in Mexico. 
 
Region Classification 
Finally, we proceed to define the main regions of the country by dividing the 32 national Mexican 
states in three regional areas characterized by similar geographical and economic features. Our 
classification recognizes three macro-regions: North, Centre and South, and is based on the National 
Plan of Development (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1999)****. This plan is a project carried out by the 
Mexican Presidence of the Republic and aims at “[contributing] to change and speed up the pace of the 
Mexican productive structure through an economic strategy based on various factors.”†††† 
 
Our data confirm that, in effect, the employment patterns vary drastically across Mexican regions. In 
fact, our results show some evidence that industrial activities are distributed and concentrated in 
specific regions. Thus, the north presents the highest rates of modern manufacturing, a feature which is 
clearly related to the outstanding presence of Maquiladoras (Table A.1.2). In addition, they show that 
informal employment rates are higher in the south and in the centre than in the north, as stated in 
section 2 (Table A.1.3). 
 
 
                                                 
**** Actually, the national plan of development recognizes five meso-regions: south, west, centre, north east and north west. 
However, in order to maximize our job transitions, we have merged data from west and centre (Centre) and from north west 
and north east (North).  
†††† Secretaria de Gobernación (Ministry of government). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo.  (p.p.4)  
(www.gobernacion.gob.mx/compilacion_juridica/webpub/Prog02.pdf). 




5. Some Descriptive Estimations 
 
As a first step, we perform logit regressions in order to determine the correlation between the different 
variables and the probability of belonging to the informal group of workers. These regressions include, 
as empirical specifications, individual characteristics such as age, age squared, schooling, gender, 
weekly hours worked, as well as the different industries in which employment has been disaggregated. 
Logit estimations are recorded in tables A.2.1-A.2.4.  
 
Roughly speaking, these results statistically support the pattern described in the previous section 
(section 4). On the one hand, they show that the probability of holding an informal job increases if the 
worker is engaged in traditional sectors such as construction activities and traditional manufacturing 
and services, and such probability decreases when they are involved in the most innovative industries 
of the economy (Modern Manufacturing and Services and Other Sectors). On the other hand, as 
expected, the formal sector is positively associated to the more modern sectors. In general, this pattern 
is evident throughout all the regions without exceptions 
 
These equations also provide information concerning the basic specification of the individual 
determinants of informality. Our results show an important and positive correlation between age and 
the probability of belonging to the informal sector as self employed in both formal and informal 
modalities; and a significant and negative correlation between age and the probability of belonging to 
informal salaried employment. This pattern holds true across all the Mexican regions and seems to 
corroborate Maloney’s hypothesis (see section 3) that workers start their work life cycle in informal 
salaried jobs, moving to other sectors only later. 
 
Summing up, even though the values of logit coefficients change across regions, a general pattern 
emerges: the probability of belonging to the informal self-employment sector increases with low 
education and age. Instead, the probability of belonging to the informal salaried employment increases 
with low education and decrease with age. In both cases, such probability increases if the worker is 
engaged in traditional and non-tradable sectors. The only variable for which an effect changes across 
regions is gender. Indeed, our regressions shows that the probability of holding an informal job 
increases if the worker is male in the north; however, this variable is non significant neither in the south 
nor in the centre. Concerning the formal employment sector, exactly the opposite pattern is observed. 




This pattern could be partially explained by regional specialization: it is well known that, in the north, 
maquiladoras (a sector which is highly related to formality) have generated a considerable number of 
jobs which have gone to young single women without work experience (Iglesias, 1997).  
 
Additional and important information is provided by the data related to wages. Following the tradition 
of a well established empirical literature, we estimate Mincerian (or earning) equations by ordinary 
least squares, where the dependent variable is given by the natural logarithm of hourly wages. Tables 
A.3.1-A.3.4 report the estimates of these Mincerian equations. We first estimate the data as a whole. 
Age is significant and positive for all the sectors. On the other hand, the gender variable is always very 
significant and shows that being male in Mexico reports a premium and such premium is higher for self 
employed workers (around 38%) than for formal salaried ones (13.4%). That is to say, concerning 
gender, that the informal sector is more unequal that the formal one. Understanding the reason behind 
this result is not easy and goes beyond the aims of this paper. However, a possible explanation would 
be that in a non-regulated sector some male characteristics (e.g. aggressiveness and physical strength) 
could exert a positive influence on wage. 
 
Finally, Mincerian equations provide some additional and descriptive information. First, the wage 
premium to schooling results always and everywhere positive and significant. In addition, our 
Mincerian equations report that self employed workers in the informal sector receive a wage premium 
if they are engaged in the service sector and report an opposite effect if they work in Traditional 
Manufacturing. Instead, formal workers receive such premium if they work in Modern Manufacturing, 
Modern Services and Other Sectors. Construction always reports positive returns for both informal and 
formal sectors. This pattern holds across all the Mexican regions.  
 
6. Labour Market Mobility 
 
In order to evaluate the mobility pattern of Mexican workers, we rely on the methodology developed 
by Maloney (1999). Even though this methodology is not universally accepted, it could be useful for 
detecting differences in the mobility patterns of workers across the different Mexican regions and, in 
addition, it allows us to compare our regional results to those of Maloney. 
 




Maloney’s methodology basically consists of a set of three transition matrixes. The first and simplest 
transition matrix (labelled as P-matrix in the literature) calculates the conditional probabilities of 
finding a worker in status j at t+k; conditional on the fact that s/he was in the status i at time t. Each 
cell of the matrix thus corresponds to 
 
pij = p(St+k = j\St = i) = p(St = i I St+k = j)/ p(St = i)   (1) 
 
The resultant P-matrix gives a raw description of movements among sectors after a certain period of 
time (one year in this case). Evidently, the diagonal represents the worker’s probability to remain in the 
sector i after the same year. We proceed to evaluate the transition matrixes for each region (left panel, 
Table A.4.1). Our results show that the probability to remain in the formal sectors is always higher than 
the conditional probability of remaining in the informal ones; those results are in line with Maloney 
(1999). This stability could be interpreted as evidence of a worker preference for formality and/or that 
informal activities are the surviving ones that emerge in certain periods of necessity of the workers life 
cycle and tend to disappear in later stages. 
 
This P-matrix could  give us some additional interesting information since it allows us to estimate if the 
conditional probability to move from formal sectors to informal sectors are higher in the less developed 
regions of the country (i.e. in the south) than in the most developed ones.  Towards this objective, we 
proceed as follow: first we estimate the C-matrix, which is the usual P matrix of each region 







C = )      (2) 
 
The C-matrices (tables A.4.2) show that the most industrialized north presents some positive dynamics 
of formal employment. In other words, in the north the standardized probability of moving from an 
informal sector to a formal one is always higher than the benchmark and the probability to move from a 
formal sector to an informal one is lower than the same benchmark. On the other hand, an opposite 
pattern is found in the south. Basically, the C-matrices show that it is much easier and/or more 




convenient to engage formal activities in the industrialized North rather than in the less developed 
south and centre. 
 
The panorama changes when we normalize the P-matrix by dividing each of its columns by the share 
of workers in each sector (e.g. P.J) at the end of the period. Following the literature, this normalized 
matrix will be called Q-matrix. The likelihood of moving from one sector to another could also depend 
on the duration of occupancy of origin and destination sectors i and j respectively. Maloney assumes 
that the larger is the time spent in the sector of origin i, or the lower the likelihood that a position will 
open in the sector of destination j, the harder is for a worker to move from i to j. To take into 









     (3) 
 
which is the Q-matrix multiplied by the product of the duration of state occupancy, in order to account 
for the existence of churning. It is assumed that this expression captures the level of “difficulty” or the 
“propensity “of moving from one sector to the other. Essentially, large V-values mean that a worker 
could spend effort to move to the destination sector even though it is difficult to do so. 
 
Therefore, the larger is the disposition to move from sector i to sector j, the larger Vij should be. 
Consider the V-matrix of a hypothetical economy characterized by strong incentives for informality 
(large taxes, low level of formal sector productivity, etc.). In this imaginary economy, workers may 
show a higher “disposition” or “propensity” to move from the formal sector to the informal one than 
vice-versa. We thus expect the following pattern of worker mobility: Vformal-informal > VInformal-formal. 
Basing upon this methodology, Maloney (1999)‡‡‡‡ found that flows from the formal sector to the 
informal one are as likely as the transitions from informal to formal sectors. This result brings him to 
conclude that there are strong reasons to question the dualistic view as the primary explanation for the 
existence of a segmented labour market in Mexico. 
 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ The data used by Maloney (1999) are pretty similar to those used here. However, two differences emerge: first, the data 
correspond to household surveys conducted in  1990 and 1991; secondly, the operational definition used: by Maloney’s 
classification only relies on the size of the firm. 




We now proceed to estimate our Q and V transition matrixes for each region separately (south, Centre, 
North). The outcomes are represented in tables A.4.1. The P-matrix is positioned at the left of those 
tables, providing a rough description of the transition probabilities we are interested in. In the middle of 
the table we find the Q-matrix that is the transition probability normalized by the size of the destination 
sector. At the right, there is the V-matrix, i.e. the “propensity” to enter in a particular sector.  
 
The results show very symmetric worker flows between formal and informal sectors across all the 
territory, which is in line with the results obtained by Maloney (1999). In fact, as expected, we find 
only a slightly higher propensity to move from the informal salaried sector to the formal salaried one. A 
symmetric pattern of movements is found also for the formal salaried workers who move to informal 
self employment and vice-versa in the south, as the V-matrix shows a slightly larger disposition to 
move from formal salaried jobs to self-employed ones than vice-versa. However, contrary to what 
expected, the pattern of mobility in the north is quite similar to that of the south.  Instead, in the centre, 
where the informality rates are higher, there is a slightly larger disposition to move from the informal 
self-employment sector to formal salaried one than from the latter to the former. 
 
Summing up, we find evidence of the existence in Mexico of symmetric patterns of employment across 
all the Mexican territory. In addition, our transition matrixes show that the economic or institutional 
set-up in the most productive and innovative region (north) favours formality.  
7. Effect of transition on Wages 
 
We now try to answer the central question of the present document: is there evidence of economic 
incentives for informality in the less developed regions of the country? Who has those incentives? 
 
We could get a first clue from a comparative analysis between the average earnings of formal and 
informal workers. Table 3 was obtained after calculating their average level of income (mean and 
media) for each labour sector. The average formal self-employed worker receives a higher 
remuneration than the informal worker (self-employed or salaried). Moreover, it is worth noting that, 









Average hourly earning of Formal and Informal Workers 
 Agriculture Formal Informal  Formal   Informal  
  Self employed Self employed Salaried Salaried 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
National 6.69 2.95 24.14 13.5 17 12.9 22.86 15.67 11.87 10.59 
south 4.84 2.32 18.11 12.6 13.11 9.49 21.53 12.87 9.19 8.4 
centre 7.19 3.14 21.5 12.6 18.17 14.8 22.42 15.1 12.69 11.25 
North 10.45 5.72 35.1 18 20.8 15.7 24.29 16.84 13.88 12.38 
 Own estimations based on the national survey of employment (INEGI) 
 
The previous results seem to confirm the idea of a poor and unproductive informal sector and seem to 
suggest that, in general, workers should prefer to belong to the formal sector. However, it is difficult to 
distinguish if a worker, given her/his skills and characteristics, would actually perceive such benefits 
when moving from the informal sector to the formal one.  
 
Differences in predicted wages provide a measure of earning changes associated with job-to job 
transitions across employment sectors. Taking advantage of the panel dimension of our data, we 
estimate the following dynamic model:  
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where the left hand side is the log hourly earning change of worker i between year t and year t-1; 
( ))1()( * −tijtik SS  is a vector of dummy variables for each possible transition from any state j in t-1 to any 
state k in time t; ( ))1()( * −timtim II  is a vector which controls for each possible transition from any  
industry m at t-1 to any industry n at any time t, X is a vector of individual characteristics, i.e., gender, 
age, education (before treatment), sector of origin; T is a time fixed effects vector. This dynamic model 
allows us to control for unobservable variables that affect the wage level. 
 
We proceed to run our wage differential equation (table 4). In this case, wage differentials regressions 
report a premium for those workers moving from formal salaried positions to informal self-employed in 
the southern (25.3%) and central (23.7%) regions. Instead, in the north such premium result negative, 




even though non-significant (-4.2%). That is to say, if we assume rationality, that formal salaried 
workers have more incentives to become informal self-employed in the less developed regions than in 
the more developed ones and that this incentive is important. Such result seems to support Maloney and 
Lucas’ hypothesis which, as we have seen in section (3), states that in a wealthy economy a worker 
would prefer to be formal salaried since, in such context, the returns to wage work and therefore the 
opportunity cost of being self-employed increases.  
 
Table 4 
Wage Differentials Estimations 
(Excluding agricultural workers) 
 
  National South Centre North 
 From Informal Self-Employed to 
 Delta Wages 
Formal Salaried -0.068 -0.108 -0.036 -0.088 
  -1.19 -0.9 -0.43 -0.93 
Informal Salaried  -0.069 -0.109 0.017 -0.145 
  -1.48 -1.3 -0.26 -1.6 
From Formal Salaried to  
Informal Self-employed 0.15 0.253 0.237 0.042 
  (2.61)** (2.39)* (2.51)* -0.47 
Informal Salaried -0.051 -0.064 -0.071 -0.016 
  (-1.43) (-0.89) (-1.36) (-0.22) 
From Informal Salaried  to     
Formal Salaried  0.095 0.08 0.125 0.079 
  (2.67)** -1.16 (2.50)* -1.25 
Informal Self-employed 0.255 0.202 0.35 0.395 
  (5.43)** (2.53)* (4.85)** (5.20)** 
Observations 8360 2362 3586 2814 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: National Survey of Employment (INEGI) 
 
On the other hand, the estimates for those workers moving from self-employed informal activities to 
formal salaried ones differ from the previous results: they show a non significant wage premium across 
all the Mexican territory without exception. This fact is quite interesting since it would suggest that an 
important share of the working population would prefer to work in the formal sector rather than in the 
formal one even if they do not perceive any economic advantage in doing so. It would also indicate that 
those workers moving from informality to formality are different from those moving from formality to 




informality. These issues require further exploration and represent, in our consideration, interesting 
avenues for future research. 
 
However, our results also suggest that the informal self-employment sector would result economically 
attractive for workers in less advantaged sectors. In fact, our estimations show that informal employed 
workers perceive a positive economic premium if they move to self-employment. A direct implication 
would be that many of those salaried informal workers have incentives to switch to the self-
employment sector and probably they do so as soon as this opportunity presents to them. 
 
Even more significant economic incentives to move to urban informality would be provided to workers 
of the agricultural sector. Indeed, it is well known that the main casualties of the post liberalization 
period were agricultural activities, in particular those characterized by traditional techniques and rain-
fed land, which usually are geographically concentrated in the south of the country. This relationship 
between the worsening of agricultural performance and the increasing incidence of informality in the 
southern would not be casual.  
 
Table 5 
Wage Differentials Estimations 
 
Delta Wages Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
From agricultural self employed to 
Informal self-employed 
(urban) 1.304616 0.139083 9.38** 0 
Formal Salaried (urban) 1.131683 0.137857 8.21** 0 
Informal Salaried (urban) 1.224548 0.115782 10.58** 0 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: National Survey of Employment (INEGI) 
 
In order to prove the presence of economic incentives for moving from agricultural activities to urban 
ones, we proceed to run our wage differential equation when including agricultural activities. Our 
results (table 5) show that there is a significant wage improvement for those workers moving from 
informal self employed positions in the agricultural sector to informal self-employment urban activities 
and that this wage improvement are as important as those produced by movements to the formal 
salaried sector. Even though we do not have enough transitions to analyze region by region, we expect 
this pattern to hold true across all the regions. A very similar outcome is found for movements between 




the agricultural activities and salaried activities in the urban informal sector. Summing up, our data 
show an important wage premium for urban activities over agricultural ones.  
 
These results reveal the presence of important wage differentials within the informal self-employment 
sector, between non-agricultural and agricultural activities. They imply also that, in the current social 
and economic Mexican context, at both aggregate and individual level, the informal urban activities are 
preferable to low productive agricultural activities§§§§. It seems that rural conditions have not changed 
over time and that the incentives to migrate from the countryside to the urban are still valid as they 




Making use of a rich dataset and a taking advantage of an increasing Mexican regional polarization, in 
this work we have investigated the following questions: a) do the determinants of informality have 
general validity or are they specific of particular regions; b) what are the patterns of worker mobility 
across Mexican Regions?; c) do those factors have general validity or are they specific of particular 
regions?; d) are there empirical elements to support any of the competing theories explaining 
informality; e) how has the increasing regional concentration of more productive and innovative 
activities affected the pattern of informal employment? 
 
Broadly speaking, our regressions show similar patterns concerning the individual determinants of 
informal employment across regions; i.e. the probability of belonging to the informal self-employment 
sector increases with low education and age: those results are in line with most of the previous 
literature on informality and self-employment. In addition, as expected, our estimations shows that the 
probability of belonging to the informal sector increases when the worker is engaged in non-tradable 
and/or traditional sectors such as construction, traditional services and traditional manufacturing.  
 
                                                 
§§§§ This result is in line with Orlando (2001) who argues that the poorest sector in the Venezuelan economy is composed by 
informal workers engaged in agricultural activities. 
***** Notice that, as it is well known, working with wage data almost necessarily entails some shortcomings. In fact, it is 
not clear if in informal self-employment worker’s earnings account for return of capital and other costs such as the briberies 
that often the informal worker is compelled to pay in order to be allowed to continue with their illegal activities. For all 
these reasons, the quantity reported in the data base should be considered only as a rough estimation of real wages. 
 




We find also a similar pattern of mobility across the different Mexican regions when using a set of 
Markov transition matrices. Nonetheless, a difference among the different regions emerges: since the 
probability to enter or to remain in the formal sectors is higher in the northern than in the southern 
macro-region, it is clear from our transition matrixes that the institutional set-up favours informality in 
the less developed regions vis-à-vis the more developed ones. 
 
In order to test if such differences are due to the presence of incentives to informality, we have run 
wage differential equations. Our results show that those workers who switch from formal salaried jobs 
to non agricultural informal self-employed ones perceive a wage premium. Interestingly, this result 
changes across regions: while in the less developed region of the country (south) this premium is 
positive and significant, in the north such premium is negative, although non significant. This result 
suggests the presence of stronger incentives to become informal worker in the less developed regions 
of the country rather than in the more industrialized ones and is in line with the theories that see the 
informal sector as a voluntary one. However, On the other hand, the estimates for those workers 
moving from self-employed informal activities to formal salaried ones differ from the previous results: 
they show a non significant wage premium across all the Mexican territory without exception. It would 
indicate that those workers moving from informality to formality are different from those moving from 
formality to informality. These issues require further exploration and represent, in our consideration, 
interesting avenues for future research. 
 
In addition, we have found some evidence of a positive and important wage premium for formal 
salaried jobs relative to less-favoured occupations, in particular self-employed agricultural activities. 
Therefore, the increasing incidence of informality in the less developed region (south and centre) could 
be partially explained by a “scissor effect” where workers are attracted to informality from the urban 
formal and agricultural activities. Of course, we are not stating that workers have a preference for 
informality; we are only observing that the economic incentives to informality are higher in the less 
developed regions of the country. 
 
Summing up, our results present evidence that different regions of Mexico have different patterns of 
employment and that such patterns are related to the regional level of development. This collective 
evidence also suggests that diverse and suitable regional policies should be applied in order to reduce 
informal employment rates and/or to reinforce and support the development process in Mexico.  







Bangasser, P. E. (2000). The ILO and the Informal Sector: an Institutional History. ILO Employment 
Paper 2000/9. International Labour Organization, Geneva. 
   
Besnainou, D. and L. Davezies (1998). "Regional Policy in Mexico." The OECD observer 210: 17-19. 
  
Bourguignon, F. (2005). Development Strategies for More and Better Jobs. Presented at the conference 
"Help Wanted: More and Better Jobs in a Globalized Economy". Organized by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. April 14, 2005 Washington, DC. 
 
Capdevielle M. (2008). La globalizaciòn del proceso productivo y sus efectos en la economìa 
mexicana. El caso de la industria maquiladora de exportaciòn. In Co-evoluciòn de empresas 
maquiladoras, instituciones y regiones: una nueva interpretación. A. Lara ed. (2008). UAM-ADIAT-
Miguel Angel Porrua, México D.F. 
  
Carr, M. and M. A. Chen (2002). Globalization and the Informal Economy: How Global Trade and 
Investment Impact on the Working Poor. ILO, Working Paper on Informal Economy, No.1. Women in 
Informal Employment. Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), Geneva. 
  
Chiquiar, D. (2004). "Why Mexico’s Regional Income Convergence Broke Down." Journal of 
Development Economics 77: 257-275. 
  
Cimoli, M., A. Primi and M. Pugno (2005). An Enclave-Led Model of Growth: the Structural Problem 
of Informality Persistence in Latin America. GRADE, Discussion Paper No. 4. Group of Research and 
Analysis on Development, Trento. 
  
De Soto, H. (1987). El Otro Sendero. La Revolución Informal. Bogotá, Instituto Libertad y 
Democracia. 
  
Dussel, E. (2000). Polarizing Mexico: the impact of Liberalization Strategy. Lyenne – Rienner 
Publishers. Boulder, CO. 
  
Dutrénit, G. and M. Cavdevielle (1993). "El Perfil Tecnológico de la Industria Mexicana y su Dinámica 
innovadora en la Década de los Ochentas." El Trimestre Economico 60(239): 643-674. 
   
Erickson, L. (2002). Informality, Firm Size and Economic Growth: Testing the Soto Hypothesis. 
Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference. Williams College's Griffin Hall, 
Williamstown, MA. 
   
Fields, G. S. (2004). "Dualism in the Labor Market: a Perspective on the Lewis Model after half 
Century." The Manchester School 72(6): 724-735. 
  
Fields, G. S. (2005). A Guide to Multisector Labor Market Models. The World Bank Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series No. 0505. The World Bank, Washington. 





Freije, S. (2001). Informal Employment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Causes, Consequences 
and Policy Recommendations. Paper presented at Regional Consultation on Labour Issues. November 
26-27. Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administration (IESA), Panama City. 
   
Gong, X. and A. Van Soest (2002). "Wage Differentials and Mobility in the Urban Labour Market: a 
panel data for Mexico." Labour Economics 115: 513-529. 
  
Harris, R. J. and M. P. Todaro (1970). "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A two Sector 
Analysis." The American Economic Review 60(1): 126-142. 
  
Hart, K. (1973). "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana." The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 11(1): 61-89. 
 
Iglesias, N. (1997). Beautiful Flowers of the Maquiladora: Life Histories of Women Workers in 
Tijuana. Austin, University of Texas Press.  
 
  
ILO (1999). Panorama Laboral 1999. America Latina y el Caribe. International Labour Organization, 
Lima. 
   
INEGI (2004). La Ocupación en el Sector no Estructurado en México, 1995-2003. Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística Geografía e Informática. México D.F. 
  
Katz, J. (1999). Reformas Estructurales, Productividad y Conducta Tecnológica. Comisión Económica 
Para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Santiago de Chile. 
 
Kuznets S., (1966), Modern Economic Growth, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
  
Lehmann, H. and N. Pignatti (2007). Informal Employment Relationships and Labor Market 
Segmentation in Transition Economies: Evidence from Ukraine. IZA Discussion Paper No 3269. 
Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
  
Lewis, A. (1954). "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour." The Manchester 
School 22: 139-191. 
  
Lucas, R. (1978). "On the Size Distribution of Business Firms." The Bell Journal of Economics 9: 508-
523. 
  
Maloney, W. F. (1999). "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence 
from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico." The World Bank Economic Review 13(12): 275-302. 
  
Maloney, W. F. (2004). "Informality Revisited." World Development 32(7): 1159-1178. 
   
Marcouiller, D., V. Ruiz de Castilla and C. Woodruff (1997). "Formal Measures of the Informal Sector 
Wage Gap in Mexico, El Salvador and Peru." Economic Development and Cultural Change 45: 367-
392. 





Pagés, C. and M. Stampini (2007). No Education, No Good Jobs? Evidence on the Relationship 
between Education and Labour Market Segmentation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3187. Institute for the 
Study of Labour, Bonn. 
  
Palma, G. (2003). Latin America during the Second Half of the 20th Century: from the “age of 
extremes” to the age of end of history uniformity. In Rethinking Development Economics, Ed.  Hang-
Joon Chang. Anthem, London. 
   
Pavitt, K. (1984). "Sectoral patterns of technical change: toward a taxonomy and theory." Research 
Policy 13: 343-373. 
  
Perry, G., W. Maloney, O. Arias, P. Fajnzylber, A. Mason and J. Saavedra-Chanduvi. (2007). 
Informality: Exit and Exclusion in Latin America. The World Bank, Washington. 
  
Pietrobelli, C. and R. Rabellotti (2004)."An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Self-Employment 
in Developing Countries." Journal of International Development 16: 803-820. 
  
Portes, A. and W. Haller (2004). La Economia Informal. Unidad de Politicas Sociales no. 100, Santiago 
de Chile. 
  
Portes, A. and R. Schauffler (1993). "Competing Perspectives on the Latin American Informal Sector." 
Population and Development Review 19(1): 33-60. 
  
Pradhan, A. and A. Van Soest (1997). "Household Labour Supply in Urban Areas of Bolivia." The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 19(1): 33-60. 
  
Ros, J. (2000). "Employment, Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Growth in Mexico." The Journal 
of Development Studies 36(4): 100-119. 
  
Souza, P. R. and V. E. Tuchman (1976). "The Informal Urban Sector in Latin America." International 
Labour Review 114(3): 355-366. 
  
Stallings, B. and J. Weller (2001). Job Creation in Latin America in the 1990s: The Foundation for 
Social Policy. United Nations, ECLAC. Santiago de Chile. 
   
Tokman, V. E. (1989). "Economic Development and Labour Market Segmentation in the Latin 
America Periphery." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31(1/2 Special Issues). 
 
Villarreal, R. (2000). Industrialización, deuda y desequilibrio externo en México. Un enfoque 
macroindustrial y financiero (1929-2000). Fondo de Cultura Económico, México. 
  
Weller, J. (2001). Economic Reforms, Growth and Employment: Labour Markets in Latin America and 










TableA.1.1. Employment by Industry and Formal status (%) 
  Informal Self-employed 
Formal 
Salaried Informal Salaried Total 
Construction  26 22.28 51.72 100 
Manufacturing (modern) 1.75 96.49 1.75 100 
Manufacturing (traditional) 26.67 55.65 17.69 100 
Services(Modern) 0.81 98.91 0.27 100 
services (traditional) 25.91 52.17 21.92 100 
Other Sectors 1.23 96.32 2.45 100 
 
 
Table A.1.2. Employment by Region and Industry (%) 
  Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services 
Region Construction (Modern) (Traditional) (Modern) (Traditional)   othersectors Total % 
National 12.44 2.57 17.31 8.42 57.43 1.84 100 
South 11.04 0.32 17.6 9.81 59.91 1.31 100 
Centre 15.68 2.82 18.06 7.63 53.79 2.01 100 
North 8.92 4.42 15.9 8.21 60.46 2.09 100 
 
 
Table A.1.3. Employment by Region and Formal Status (%) 
  Formal Self Employed Informal Self-employed Formal Salaried Informal Salaried Total
National  9.99 20.3 49.65 20.06 100
south 10.01 25.67 43.82 20.5 100
centre 10.45 18.71 45.43 25.41 100
north 9.27 17.36 61.8 11.56 100
 
Source: Own elaboration based on ENEU survey (INEGI). 
 













National SEF SEI SF SI 
     
Age 0.05 0.037 -0.024 -0.047 
 (16.93)** (16.44)** (12.08)** (18.44)** 
Gender -0.437 0.024 0.188 0.034 
 (5.37)** -0.35 (3.40)** -0.48 
Schooling 0.085 -0.072 0.09 -0.132 
 (10.09)** (9.37)** (14.67)** (15.28)** 
Services (Modern) -1.749 -3.686 3.275 -3.357 
 (4.96)** (8.77)** (13.11)** (4.70)** 
Services (Traditional) 1.089 -0.23 -0.433 0.377 
 (8.13)** (3.10)** (6.93)** (4.70)** 
WeeeklyHours 0.032 -0.029 0.012 -0.008 
 (13.29)** (14.66)** (7.52)** (4.16)** 
Construction  0.127 -1.478 1.706 
  -1.28 (15.79)** (17.43)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern)  -2.542 2.934 -2.37 
  (4.98)** (8.03)** (4.64)** 
OtherSectors  -3.138 2.987 -1.626 
  (4.38)** (7.08)** (3.16)** 
Constant -6.737 -0.781 -0.285 1.121 
 (28.68)** (5.41)** (2.31)* (7.23)** 
Observations 7359 8851 8851 8851 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 






















The Determinants of Employment Sector (South) 
Logit Estimations 
 
South FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.042 0.036 -0.022 -0.047 
  (7.73)** (8.96)** (5.82)** (10.06)** 
Gender -0.521 -0.184 0.191 0.394 
  (3.44)** -1.54 -1.8 (2.98)** 
Schooling 0.082 -0.085 0.099 -0.108 
  (5.30)** (6.30)** (8.76)** (7.24)** 
Services (Traditional) 1.178 -0.546 -0.006 0.191 
  (4.57)** (4.28)** -0.05 -1.31 
WeeeklyHours 0.029 -0.024 0.01 -0.003 
  (6.78)** (7.35)** (3.57)** -0.85 
Construction   -0.235 -0.996 1.389 
    -1.26 (5.26)** (7.45)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern)   -1.689 1.732 -0.179 
    -1.51 (2.01)* -0.16 
Services (Modern)   -3.99 4.362 -3.083 
    (5.46)** (7.28)** (3.03)** 
OtherSectors     2.161 -0.127 
      (3.88)** -0.22 
Constant -6.309 -0.242 -0.903 0.663 
  (14.66)** -1.03 (4.09)** (2.53)* 
Observations 1951 2484 2517 2517 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
























The Determinants of Employment Sector (Centre) 
Logit Estimations 
 
Centre FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.056 0.037 -0.021 -0.051 
  (12.26)** (10.64)** (6.66)** (13.64)** 
Gender -0.516 0.119 0.203 -0.027 
  (4.20)** -1.09 (2.34)* -0.27 
Schooling 0.105 -0.068 0.085 -0.129 
  (8.04)** (5.50)** (8.67)** (10.04)** 
Services (Modern) -1.447 -3.253 2.988   
  (3.25)** (5.42)** (8.76)**   
Services (Traditional) 1.116 0.028 -0.696 0.381 
  (5.69)** -0.23 (7.36)** (3.39)** 
WeeeklyHours 0.03 -0.034 0.015 -0.009 
  (8.44)** (10.45)** (5.94)** (3.20)** 
Construction   0.319 -1.803 1.707 
    (2.14)* (13.09)** (12.71)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern)   -2.086 2.565 -2.199 
    (2.88)** (5.50)** (3.69)** 
OtherSectors   -2.795 4.01   
    (2.75)** (3.96)**   
Constant -6.891 -0.992 -0.501 1.597 
  (19.45)** (4.12)** (2.55)* (6.82)** 
Observations 3029 3813 3813 3444 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 

























The Determinants of Employment Sector (North) 
Logit Estimations 
 
North FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.052 0.039 -0.036 -0.036 
  (8.98)** (8.93)** (9.67)** (6.61)** 
Gender -0.192 0.318 0.067 -0.378 
  -1.2 (2.36)* -0.64 (2.43)* 
Schooling 0.069 -0.035 0.061 -0.179 
  (4.21)** (2.41)* (5.31)** (8.53)** 
Services (Modern) -1.494 -4.097 2.931 -2.039 
  (2.30)* (4.02)** (6.16)** (1.98)* 
Services (Traditional) 0.946 -0.126 -0.537 0.658 
  (3.57)** -0.82 (4.25)** (3.17)** 
WeeeklyHours 0.036 -0.028 0.014 -0.026 
  (7.43)** (6.68)** (4.16)** (5.31)** 
Construction   0.45 -1.292 1.989 
    (2.18)* (6.94)** (8.01)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern)   -2.98 3.732   
    (2.93)** (3.69)**   
OtherSectors   -2.522 3.231   
    (2.47)* (3.17)**   
Constant -7.078 -1.671 0.986 1.288 
  (15.12)** (5.44)** (3.93)** (3.34)** 
Observations 2132 2521 2521 2356 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
























Estimated log earnings equations (National) 
Mincerian Estimations 
 
National FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.024 0.038 0.048 0.03 
  -1.84 (5.19)** (13.66)** (6.77)** 
Age^2 0 0 0 0 
  -1.79 (5.49)** (10.06)** (5.77)** 
Gender 0.401 0.383 0.134 0.241 
  (6.47)** (9.10)** (7.10)** (7.36)** 
Schooling 0.048 0.05 0.069 0.022 
  (7.47)** (9.24)** (33.96)** (5.27)** 
Construction 0 0.424 0.282 0.295 
  (.) (6.50)** (6.75)** (6.99)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern) 0 0.112 0.22 0.314 
  (.) -0.28 (5.11)** -1.14 
Services (Modern) 1.042 1.045 0.471 0.38 
  (3.48)** (3.19)** (14.02)** -0.97 
Services (Traditional) -0.034 0.209 0.043 0.194 
  -0.3 (4.49)** -1.83 (5.00)** 
OtherSectors 0 -0.11 0.245 -0.052 
  (.) -0.2 (4.87)** -0.19 
Constant 1.495 1.008 0.889 1.23 
  (4.48)** (5.68)** (13.24)** (13.08)** 
Observations 884 1800 4392 1775 
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.43 0.11 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 

























Estimated log earnings equations (South) 
Mincerian Estimations 
 
South FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.037 0.032 0.055 0.035 
  -1.45 (2.52)* (8.03)** (4.45)** 
Age^2 0 0 0 0 
  -1.44 (2.59)** (5.73)** (3.57)** 
Gender 0.318 0.481 0.114 0.452 
  (2.88)** (6.64)** (3.10)** (7.90)** 
Schooling 0.029 0.04 0.077 0.024 
  (2.73)** (3.89)** (20.03)** (3.26)** 
Services (Traditional) 0.031 0.312 0.301 0.337 
  -0.15 (4.23)** (5.75)** (5.16)** 
Construction   0.418 0.566 0.453 
    (3.48)** (6.49)** (6.12)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern)   0.766 0.986 0.414 
    -0.94 (4.21)** -0.79 
Services (Modern)   1.886 0.84 1.188 
    (3.25)** (12.07)** (2.24)* 
OtherSectors   0 0.92 0.268 
    (.) (7.88)** -1.01 
Constant 1.251 0.848 0.187 0.559 
  -1.95 (2.80)** -1.41 (3.43)** 
Observations 252 646 1103 516 
R-squared 0.09 0.2 0.6 0.27 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 























Estimated log earnings equations (Centre) 
Mincerian Estimations 
 
Centre FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.024 0.052 0.043 0.037 
  -1.43 (4.78)** (7.95)** (6.16)** 
Age^2 0 -0.001 0 0 
  -1.23 (5.57)** (5.43)** (5.94)** 
Gender 0.283 0.255 0.13 0.219 
  (3.29)** (3.96)** (4.58)** (5.22)** 
Schooling 0.053 0.032 0.068 0.014 
  (5.55)** (3.78)** (22.16)** (2.64)** 
Construction 0 0.358 0.227 0.205 
  (.) (3.78)** (3.91)** (3.95)** 
Manufacturing 
(Modern) 0 -0.006 0.031 0.203 
  (.) -0.01 -0.53 -0.69 
Services (Modern) 1.253 0.707 0.365 0 
  (3.55)** -1.61 (7.64)** (.) 
Services (Traditional) -0.236 0.123 -0.079 0.085 
  -1.52 -1.63 (2.35)* -1.75 
OtherSectors 0 -0.054 0.123 0 
  (.) -0.07 -1.84 (.) 
Constant 1.559 1.159 1.09 1.4 
  (3.56)** (4.19)** (10.86)** (11.45)** 
Observations 399 714 1730 970 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.11 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
























Estimated log earnings equations (North) 
Mincerian Estimations 
 
North FSE ISE FS IS 
          
Age 0.013 0.001 0.047 0.023 
  -0.46 -0.08 (8.46)** (2.52)* 
Age^2 0 0 0 0 
  -0.65 -0.18 (6.96)** -1.94 
Gender 0.612 0.263 0.125 0.079 
  (4.48)** (3.12)** (4.04)** -1.02 
Schooling 0.06 0.052 0.058 0.025 
  (4.31)** (5.57)** (16.53)** (2.39)* 
Construction 0 0.136 0.24 0.079 
  (.) -1.03 (3.36)** -0.68 
Manufacturing 
(Modern) 0 -1.176 0.174 0 
  (.) -1.53 (2.76)** (.) 
Services (Modern) 0.383 0.134 0.499 -0.249 
  -0.64 -0.17 (8.56)** -0.45 
Services (Traditional) 0.267 -0.177 0.123 0.172 
  -1.12 -1.79 (3.10)** -1.6 
OtherSectors 0 -0.634 0.053 0 
  (.) -0.83 -0.62 (.) 
Constant 1.613 2.298 1.16 1.656 
  (2.11)* (6.40)** (10.44)** (7.21)** 
Observations 233 440 1559 289 
R-squared 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.05 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 

















south               
 P Matrix     Q Matrix     V Matrix    
 OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS 
OLF 0,889 0,062 0,030 0,019   0,406 0,124 0,192   11,282 7,184 3,842 
ISE 0,177 0,674 0,049 0,100  0,348  0,203 0,998  9,651  3,981 6,785 
FS 0,038 0,038 0,844 0,081  0,074 0,249  0,808  4,281 4,882  11,425 
IS 0,098 0,155 0,199 0,548  0,193 1,021 0,831   3,865 6,942 11,75  
               
centre               
 OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS 
OLF 0,895 0,040 0,032 0,033   0,411 0,117 0,250   9,1372 7,1489 6,1505 
ISE 0,210 0,572 0,083 0,134  0,424  0,302 1,029  9,4233  4,5186 6,2179 
FS 0,046 0,027 0,844 0,083  0,093 0,272  0,640  5,6499 4,0735  10,6 
IS 0,095 0,095 0,197 0,613  0,191 0,969 0,716   4,6934 5,8567 11,851  
               
North               
 OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS  OLF ISE FS IS 
OLF 0,912 0,029 0,039 0,020   0,294 0,109 0,288   9,715 10,855 5,991 
ISE 0,162 0,656 0,099 0,082  0,344  0,275 1,201  11,36  7,055 6,411 
FS 0,026 0,029 0,887 0,058  0,056 0,289  0,851  5,56 7,412  13,757 
IS 0,118 0,163 0,264 0,455  0,250 1,634 0,734   5,21 8,724 11,872  





















C =  
 
 
South           Centre         North       
               
 OLF ISE FS IS   OLF ISE FS IS   OLF ISE FS IS 
OLF 0.99319 1.246 0.81143 0.8041  0.98618 1.0093 0.99985 1.2566  1.0328 0.69543 1.2209 0.76912 
ISE 0.85863 1.0976 0.7373 1.0252  1.1962 0.92211 1.0363 1.1234  0.87408 0.97212 1.4208 0.7065 
FS 0.81859 1.4586 0.96365 1.1497  1.3126 0.8623 0.96543 1.1924  0.75444 0.86488 1.0634 0.68096 
IS 0.89167 1.3398 0.92162 0.95523  0.9808 0.78102 0.90964 1.1016  1.2649 1.1313 1.4552 0.73209 
               
                              
 
 
 
 
 
